![]() In what follows, I will isolate some basic assumptions shared by many current approaches to Hegel. I will argue that such a particular approach to the text is able to solve several of the typical interpretative and argumentative difficulties affecting standard readings of Hegel's later thought. Doing so will allow me to illuminate and defend an approach to Hegel's work that is underexplored in this scholarly context. In this article, I will investigate Hegel's texts with the aim of making order of this controversy by systematizing the conceptual space for possible interpretations. Footnote 2 Within this context, several controversies have arisen regarding how to interpret both the structure of Hegel's argument as well as its core claims. Footnote 1 The past few years, however, have seen a growing appreciation of Hegel's later views on these topics. ![]() ![]() Until recently, discussion of Hegel's theoretical position on mind and cognition had been limited mostly to the thoughts outlined in his early writings and the Phenomenology, while his later ideas have remained largely off the radar. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation ( Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and animal minds-two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |